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ESSAYS
On the Cutting Edge:
Charting the Future of Sexual Orientation and
Gender Identity Scholarship
Thirtyyears ago,Rhonda Riverapublished "OurSnight-Laced Judges: The LegalPosition
ofHomosexualiPersonsh7 the UnitedStates," the first comprehensivelaw review articleofits land
Since then, the sexual orientationandgender identity legalliteraturehas exploded with hundreds
of articlesconsideringall imaginable aspects ofthe law relationshipto genderidentity andsexual
orientation. At the same time, politicaldemands oflesbians,gay men, bisexuals, and transgender
have both multiplied and moved to the center of cultural debates, and the body of case law
addressingthese issues has likewise grown exponentially Wiat, then, are the next steps for legal
scholarship?
These Essaysserve to highlight new issues, new theories,possibilitiesfor linking theory and
practice, and visions ofthe field for the decade(s) to come.
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HAVE WE ARRIVED YET? LGBT RIGHTS AND THE
LIMITS OF FORMAL EQUALITY

Katie R. Eyer*
A decade ago when I joined the LGBT civil rights movement, the
promise of formal equality' seemed remote. Bowers v Hardwick
remained the law of the land, no state had recognized same-sex marriage,
and legislative protections for the LGBT community were few and far
between. Today, the legal and political landscape has been radically
reconfigured, and we are tantalizingly close to achieving many of the
goals of formal legal equality: marriage protections are proliferating
through legislation and litigation, a gay and transgender-inclusive federal
nondiscrimination statute seems within reach, and the antigay rhetoric of
Bowers has been replaced by Lawrence v Texas.3
So have we arrived yet? My reluctant answer to this question is
"No." To be sure, we are close to achieving many of the legal doctrines
that will secure formal legal equality for the LGBT community. But
achieving these doctrinal goals is just the first step on the road to
equality. As scholars of race and gender equality (among others) have
long recognized, achieving true equality within a formal equality regime
poses many serious challenges.4 It is this next set of challenges to which
we as LGBT scholars will increasingly need to direct our attention if we
are to ensure that our hard-fought struggles for legal equality will have
real meaning.
How can we best address this next set of challenges? As the
existing efforts of LGBT scholars demonstrate, there are a multiplicity of
possible areas to explore LGBT legal scholars, however, have mostly
been curiously silent on what is perhaps the most serious practical issue
that the movement will face as it moves towards formal equality: the
shift to a regime in which covert or structural discrimination will take the

© 2010 Katie R. Eyer. Research Scholar, Alice Paul Center for Research on Women,
Gender and Sexuality, University of Pennsylvania. Many thanks to Serena Mayeri and Jane
Baron for their helpful feedback.
1.
I use the term "formal equality" to refer to a legal system in which it is unlawful to
intentionally discriminate against members of a protected group.
2.
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
3.
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
4.
See inhFa note 6 and accompanying text.
5.
See, e.g., NANcY POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL
FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (2008); Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine, Re/modeling Gender, 18
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 15 (2003); KENJ YOSHLNO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR
CIVIL RIGHTS (2006).
*
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place of overtly expressed bias. Below, I provide a brief delineation of
the problem, together with some initial thoughts on potential solutions.
A.

The Problem

The problem, as it has been identified by prior civil rights theorists,
is this6 : while some discrimination disappears when discrimination
becomes formally unlawful, much of what previously would have been
expressed as overt bias simply becomes covert. Moreover, even those
people who believe themselves to be nondiscriminatory may act out of
unconscious biases and/or make decisions that systematically
disadvantage the protected class.
The standards for proving
discrimination that have been crafted by conservative federal judges are
poorly situated to detect and address covert, unconscious, and structural
biases. And, even if the legal standards were more adequate, the legal
decision makers themselves-from the predominantly conservative
judges to the jurors-are weary of identity politics and skeptical of the
existence of discrimination.
These concerns are not merely theoretical, as statistics from the
employment discrimination context illustrate.7 Of federal employment
discrimination plaintiffs who face defense motions for summary
judgment (which include virtually all employment cases that do not
settle), 63.6% lose those motions and see their cases dismissed before
trial.8 Of those who make it through the summary judgment process and
go to trial, only a small fraction (28.47%) ultimately will obtain a
favorable verdict.' These few plaintiff trial victories then face a 41.10%
chance of being reversed on appeal.'" (In contrast, only 8.72% of defense
employment verdicts are reversed on appeal.").
Real-life experiences confirm that these statistics are reflective of
what is (from the perspective of a civil rights litigant) an almost shocking
6.
This is obviously a rough sketch of what is a rich and varied literature. For a number
of significant contributions, see, for example, Derrick Bell, The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1985); Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmakrng and Unconscious
Discimination,56 ALA. L. REV. 741 (2005); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id the Ego and Equal
Protection, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987); Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108
COLUM. L. REv. 1093, 1156-69 (2008); Reva Siegel, Why EqualProtectionNo Longer Protects:
The Evolving FormsofStatus-Enforcing StateAction, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1111 (1997).
7.
All statistics are taken from Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment
Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARv. L. & PoL'Y REv. 103
(2009).
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 128 n.68.
Id. at 129.
Id. at 109.
Id.
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level of inability or unwillingness to see covert or structural discrimination. In my own practice, I recently tried an age discrimination case to a
deadlocked jury. When I spoke with the jury afterwards, I discovered
that even those jurors who were the holdouts in refusing to find
discriminationbelieved: (1) that one of my clients had been told that the
layoffs would target older workers; (2) that the layoff did in fact target
only workers in the fifty-five-or-older category; (3) that three of the
people involved in making the layoff decisions had previously engaged in
age discrimination; and (4) that the defendant had repeatedly changed its
reasons for targeting the older workers. Absent an actual admission of
discriminatory animus, it is difficult to envision what more one could do
to persuade such jurors. While this is, of course, a single case, it is
hardly an isolated example; numerous studies have found a pervasive
unwillingness by judges and jurors to recognize covert and structural
discrimination. 2
Moreover, there is little reason to believe that gay and transgender
litigants will somehow be immune from this phenomenon. Already, as
social attitudes toward the LGBT community have begun to evolve, prior
overt forms of bias have been transformed to softer, more socially
acceptable expressions of antigay animus. For example, Professor
William Eskridge, Jr., has tracked the evolution of antigay discourse from
an overtly antigay natural law or medical model to the less direct (but no
less antigay) "no promo homo" approach (which stresses that adopting
equal rights for gays will improperly "promote" homosexuality).' 3 As the
strength of legal equality guarantees for the LGBT community have
continued to increase, this "no promo homo" approach has itself begun
shifting towards the regime of covert, structural and unconscious
discrimination that already predominates in the context of other formally
protected groups."
B.

The Solutions?

It would be impossible to canvass here the multiplicity of solutions
that have been developed by civil rights theorists in response to this longstanding concern. However, one observation is worth making: both
experience and theory suggest that doctrinal reform is not likely to be an
effective cure. Over the last several decades, scholars have come forward
12. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 6, at 790 n.261; Robinson, supranote 6, at 1127-30, 1160.
13. William N. Eskridge, Jr., No PromoHomo: The Sedimentation of Antigay Discourse
andthe ChannelingEffect oflJucialReview, 75 N.YU. L. REv. 1327, 1328-30 (2000).
14. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Axcan Scandipharm, No. Civ.A.05-243, 2006 WL 456173 (W.D.
Pa. 2006); Zavatsky v. Anderson, No. Civ.3:00CV844(AVC), 2004 WL 936170 (D. Conn. 2004).
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with a panoply of thoughtful well-researched proposals to reform
nondiscrimination law to better address problems of structural and covert
biases." Virtually none of these proposals have been adopted. The work
of social psychology scholars provides insight into why this may be so:
as such scholars have found, both cognitive and motivational factors
predispose most of us towards perceiving only the most overtly
discriminatory acts as discrimination. 6 Unsurprisingly, then, efforts to
entrench in the law a more radical vision of what "counts" as
discrimination have often met with resistance, if not outright rebellion
among juridical actors.'7
So if we cannot fix nondiscrimination law, what is the alternative?
One alternative-increasingly popular with civil rights scholars-would
be to encourage employers and other societal actors to adopt internal
reforms aimed at preventing or remedying discrimination. 8 Although
this approach has some facial appeal, I am not overly optimistic about its
likelihood of success. Social science research shows that internal
antibias programs (such as diversity training) often have little effect. 9
And, as the very examples used by nondiscrimination scholars illustrate,
undertaking truly effective antibias reforms typically requires substantial
investments of time and money, investments most employers and
governmental actors seem unlikely to undertake.
Another more radical alternative would be to consider moving away
from an identity politics model (a model focused specifically on groupbased nondiscrimination claims) toward a more broad-based approach."
This alternative may evoke strong (negative) reactions from those of us
who have built our professional identities around civil rights advocacy
and scholarship, as it seems at first glance to advocate the abandonment
15.
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
16.
See, e.g., Laurie T.O'Brien et al., Understanding White Amencans' Perceptions of
Racism mnHurricaneKatrina-RelatedEvents, 12 GRoup PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 431
(2009); Karen Ruggiero & Donald Taylor, Coping with Discrimination: How Disadvantaged
Group MembersPerceive the DiscrirmnationThat Confronts Them, 68 J.OF PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. 826 (1995). The influence of cognitive and motivational factors in the perception of
discrimination is the subject of a longer work-in-progress by the author.
17.
See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, SociolegalBacklash, in BACKLASH AGAINST THE
ADA: REFNTERPRETATING DISABILITY RIGHTS 340 (Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., 2006).
18.
See, e.g., Susan Strum, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A
StructuralApproach,101 COLUM. L. REv. 458 (2001).
19.
See, e.g., Alexandra Kalev et al., Best Practices or Best Guesses? Assessing the
Efflcacy of CorporateAffirmative Action and Diversity Policies, 71 AM. SOC. REv. 589, 593
(2006).
20. For example, the Family and Medical Leave Act attacks problems of structural and
covert bias against women and people with disabilities, without relying on discrimination rubric
or limiting who may utilize its remedies.
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of decades of hard work in the identity politics vein. I do not believe,
however, that this alternative needs to be viewed in such a dichotomous
fashion. It seems self-evident that an identity politics model is necessary
in order for a legally disfavored group to make the transition to formal
legal equality, and that such a transition is a necessary precursor to any
deeper equality work. Moreover, even following the transition to formal
legal equality, some forms of bias (including overt bias) will continue to
be best addressed through an identity politics approach.
It seems equally obvious, however, that a more inclusive model may
be best situated to addressing problems of covert and structural
discrimination within a formal equality regime. Social psychology tells
us that there are substantial motivational and cognitive factors that cause
many of us to resist making attributions to discrimination in all but the
most overt circumstances." These factors simply do not apply, however,
where the question is not framed as one of "discrimination" (as, for
example, in the context of a "just cause" termination statute, where the
question is simply whether the person was terminated for "just cause")."
Moreover, the political backlash that typically accompanies identitypolitics-based attempts to address covert and structural biases could
potentially be significantly blunted by focusing on strategies that
incorporate broad-based and inclusive remedies.23
Of course, there will not be a basis in every circumstance for a nonidentity-politics-based approach.
But it is not hard to envision
developing such an approach in many of the areas in which we seek to do
equality work. To provide just a few examples: (1) "just cause"
legislation (which requires "just cause" for the termination of any
employee) in the employment context; (2) reform of the "best interest of
the child" standard (to make the standard applied less arbitrary and
subjective for all parents) in the family law context; and (3) universal
health care coverage of medically necessary care (for everyone, including
unmarried couples and members of the transgender community). Even if
such approaches merely supplement (and do not supplant) more
traditional nondiscrimination arguments, they are sure to increase the
buy-in of a public that, at best, does not understand claims of covert or
structural discrimination and at worst views such claims as "special
rights."

21.
22.

See, e.g.,
O'Brien, supranote 16 and accompanying text.
Id.

23.
Cf THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 421-45 (Margaret Wier et
al. eds., 1988).
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C. Conclusion
We, as scholars of the LGBT civil rights movement, have the
advantage of knowing what obstacles we are likely to face once we
achieve the objective of formal legal equality. What we do with this
information is up to us. Will we face the disappointments of formal legal
equality as other prior groups have? No doubt yes, to some extent. But
perhaps, by taking seriously the challenges of those who have succeeded
in their struggles for formal equality before us, we can find ways to
ensure that LGBT litigants (and all others who could benefit from the
reforms we seek) face a more hopeful future.
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NAMING'S NECESSITY

Elizabeth M. Glazer*
Writing about the law's relationship to sexual orientation and gender
identity presents authors with a number of choices. Topics range widely.'
Different areas of law intersect with different aspects of sexual
orientation and gender identity.2 With her publication of Our StraightLacedJudges. The LegalPosion ofHomosexual Personsi the United
States, Rhonda Rivera created not just avenues but an entire
infrastructure of possible routes on which legal scholars writing about
issues relating to sexual orientation and gender identity can travel.
Rivera wrote the article to "provide a comprehensive picture of the
legal position of homosexual persons in the United States [in 1979]." At
the time Rivera wrote, "this area of the law [wa]s so young and so
fragmented it [w]as not.., possible to find broad rules which cut across
all the areas involved."5 A lot has changed since Rivera published her
article. While there is a continuing need for legal commentary on issues
related to sexual orientation and gender identity, simply choosing to write
about these issues is no longer novel. Bill Rubenstein's memory of an
evening spent in the library at Harvard Law School when, as he went
"[u]p and down the cavernous corridors and through the labyrinth of
stacks," he could find "no casebooks, no hornbooks, no treatises, no

*
@ 2010 Elizabeth M. Glazer. Associate Professor of Law at Hofstra University Law
School and the Co-Director of the Hofstra LGBT Rights Fellowship, received B.A. and M.A.
degrees in philosophy from the University of Pennsylvania in 2001. Professor Glazer received a
I.D. in 2004 from the University of Chicago, while serving as a member of the Law Review.
Following graduation from law school, Professor Glazer was associated with the New York office
of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, LLP
1.
Nothing more than a cursory browsing of compiled syllabi for the Law & Sexuality
course is necessary to conclude that a wide range of topics fit within the intersection. See, e.g.,
WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, CARLOS A. BALL & JANE S. SCHACTER, TEACHER'S MANUAL TO CASES
AND MATERIALS ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW app. A (2d ed., 1998). Some have even
brought issues related to sexual orientation and gender identity into classrooms devoted to the
study of another area of law. See Anthony C. Infanti, Bringing Sexual Orientationand Gender
Identity into the Tax Classroom,59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3 (2009).
2.
See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Same-Sex Couples and the Federal Tax Laws, 1 LAw &
SEXUALITY 97 (1991); Elizabeth M. Glazer, Hhen Obscenity Discriminates,102 Nw. U. L. REv.
1379 (2008) (arguing that the First Amendment's obscenity doctrine has generated discriminatory
collateral effects against gays and lesbians); Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine, Re/modeling

Gender,18 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 15 (2003).
3.
Rhonda Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges. The Legal Position of Homosexual

Persons in the UnitedState; 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799 (1979).
4.
Id.at 799.
5.
Id at 947.
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black letter guides, no practice pointers... about [his] life,"' is a memory
that will not be relived by the four to five percent of law students who
today identify as he did
Predictably, now that ground has been laid, writers wishing to
contribute to the literature must discover side streets or bumps in the road
on which to focus their scholarship. Of course, by that I do not mean to
minimize the importance of either early or more recent scholarship.
Similar to the way in which a patented device represents a "substantial
discovery" but derives additional value from its ability to "add[] to our
knowledge and marks a step in advance of the useful arts," early legal
commentary on sexual orientation and gender identity issues made
possible the subsequent explosion of scholarly interest in the topic.8 And
authors of more recent scholarship must-in order to contribute
meaningfully to the conversation-understand how to add value to the
substantial discoveries of their predecessors.
This requires later authors to understand the value of earlier authors'
work, which also requires a later author to explain the ways in which his
work differs from that of his predecessors.
For example, an
understanding of the law as it relates to homosexuals is required before
one can appreciate Mary Anne Case's insight that the law as it relates to
gays and lesbians should take as its analytical unit not the gay or lesbian
individual, but instead the gay or lesbian couple, for it is coupling that is
"'the behavior that defines the class' of homosexuals."9 And an
understanding of same-sex coupling is required before one can
appreciate Holning Lau's insight that the constitutionality of public
accommodations laws, in particular, should be analyzed by reference to
the couple rather than the gay or lesbian individual."
Of course, this is not a unique phenomenon. Any new author
writing about any area of law must distinguish himself from those who
have come before him. However, a difference between earlier and later
pieces of scholarship about the law as it relates to sexual orientation and
6.

WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN

ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND

THE LAW (3d ed. 2008).

7.
Kelly Strader et al., An Assessment of the Law School Climate for GLBT Students,
58 J. LEGAL EDUC. 214, 217, 226 (2008) (reporting, based on data from the Law School
Admission Council, that between four and five percent of law students identify as gay, lesbian,
bisexual, or transgender).
8.
Atl. Works v. Brady,107 U.S. 192, 200 (1883).
9.
Mary Anne Case, Couples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A Comment on the
Legal History of Litigating for Gay and Lesbian Rights, 79 VA. L. REV. 1643, 1643 (1993)
(quoting Padula v. Webster, 822 E2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
10. Holning Lau, Tanscending the Individualist Parihgm in Sexual Orientation
AntidiscriminationLaw, 94 CAL. L. REv. 1271 (2006).

LA W& SEXUALITY

[Vol. 19

gender identity issues is an evolving concept not only of what the law
should protect, but of whom the law should protect.
Alongside the evolving concept of whom the law governing sexual
orientation and gender identity should protect, there has existed an
unspoken negotiation about what to call the protected individuals.
Rhonda Rivera has written about "homosexuals." William N. Eskridge
has written about "gays."" Mary Anne Case has written about "gays and
lesbians."'2 Chai Feldblum has written about "LGBT" people.'3 Holning
Lau has written about the "sexual minority,"' and later about "SOGI
minorities."' 5 Sometimes when legal scholars refer to members of the
group they do so in order to limit the scope of their prescriptions. Kenji
Yoshino's discussion of the bisexual,'6 Zachary A. Kramer's discussion of
the heterosexual,17 Julie A. Greenberg's discussion of the intersexed,'8 and
Taylor Flynn's discussion of the transgender person come to mind.'9 But
not always. And when contrasted with the explicit treatment that legal
scholars writing in this area have offered to distinguish themselves from
their predecessors, it seems worth noting that these name changes have
gone undocumented.
Rhonda Rivera broke ground by writing a piece which she probably
would have called by a different name had she written it today. Today,
the word "homosexual" is one that is most often heard spoken by people
who hate him, who think he is ill," or that he has an "agenda."2' And
11.

WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FuTURE OF GAY
(2001).
12. See Case, supra note 9, at 1693.
13. See Chai Feldblum, Moral Conflict andLiberty GayRghts andReligion,72 Brook.
L. Rev. 61, 63 (2006) ("I first want to make transparent the conflict that I believe exists between
laws intended to protect the liberty of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and wansgender (LGBT) people so
that they may live lives of dignity and integrity and the religious beliefs of some individuals
whose conduct is regulated by such laws.").
14. Lau, supranote 10, at 1273 n.9.
15. Holning Lau, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity American Law in Light of
EastAsianDevelopments, 31 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 67 (2008).
16. Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure,52 STAN. L. REv. 353
(2000).
17. Zachary A. Kramer, HeterosexualityandTitle VH1 103 Nw. U. L. REv. 205 (2009).
18. Julie A. Greenberg, De-ining Male and Female. Intersexuality and the Collision
BetweenLawandBiology,41 ARiz. L. REv 265 (1999).
19. Taylor Flynn, Transforming the Debate. Wy We Need To Include Transgender
PRghtsin the Sftggles for Sex and Sexual OnentationEquality, 101 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 392
(2001).
20. See Gay Adjectives vs. Lesbian Nouns (Sept. 16, 2008), http://thenewgay.net/2008/
09/gay-adjectives-vs-lesbian-nouns.html.
21.
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Today's
opinion is the product of a Court, which is the product of a law-profession culture, that has largely
signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda, by which I mean the agenda promoted by some
RIGHTS
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even the abbreviation that includes lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender people--"LGBT"--has been criticized for not being
inclusive enough.22 It is not my position that legal scholarship about
issues that relate to these groups, whatever an author chooses to call
them, needs to refer to them by only one name. It is also not my position
that one particular name is better than another. But names are
important.3
Philosophers of language debate about the level of
importance that should attach to names-whether names are synonymous with or separate from the objects that they describe-but all would
agree that naming is essential so that those engaged in language with
others can productively communicate about and refer to objects (or
individuals) in the world. And names are particularly important at the
intersection of law and sexual orientation and gender identity because so
much of the progress made by scholarship in this area relates to whom
the law should apply.
So before charting the future of legal scholarship about sexual
orientation and gender identity, we who write about these issues should
pause to discuss an admittedly basic premise in our writing. We should
pause to have the conversation that we have been having silently already:
the conversation about what it means when we use one name or another
to refer to each other. Because we can only communicate with each
other about the future of sexual orientation and gender identity law when
we know exactly what we mean when we refer to our constituent group.

homosexual activists directed at eliminating the moral opprobrium that has traditionally attached
to homosexual conduct.").
22. See Lau, supra note 15.
23. See SAUL KRIPKE, NAMING AND NECESSITY (Blackwell Publishing 1981) (1972);
SAUL A. KRiPKE, WrrTGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (Blackwell 2d ed. 2000).

(1982);

LUDWIG
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BRIDGING MARRIAGE SKEPTICISM AND MARRIAGE EQUALITY

Suzanne A. Kim*
Conventional wisdom divides the debate on the left concerning
same-sex marriage into those who argue for "marriage equality," viewing
the right of access to marriage as a civil right,' and those on the right who
treat the effort to obtain marriage as regressive, limited, and troublingly
assimilationist.2 But a third position has gone unexamined. A few have
encouraged us to consider ways to articulate a position in support of
same-sex marriage while criticizing marriage? I offer the term "skeptical
marriage equality" to identify this middle position, skeptical of marriage
as a legal category and its privileged place in law and society but
favoring same-sex marriage because of the motivations for or
consequences of barring it.
How can we harmonize the powerful and compelling critique of
marriage advanced by feminist and queer scholars while simultaneously
supporting same-sex marriage? This Essay attempts to do so by arguing
that same-sex marriage may not only make marriage internally less
hierarchical as others have argued, but it may, more importantly, unsettle
the hierarchical relationship between marriage and other forms of
intimacy under the law.
The pursuit of same-sex marriage facilitates the pluralistic goals of
the marriage critique, and the destabilization of marital primacy, by
*
© 2010 Suzanne A. Kim. Professor Suzanne A. Kim joined the Rutgers faculty in
2006 as an associate professor. Her scholarship focuses on the intersection of gender, critical
theory, and family law. Prior to joining the Rutgers faculty, Professor Kim was a lecturer-in-law
at Stanford Law School. Thanks to Carlos Ball and Naomi Mezey for comments on early drafts.
Thanks also to Heidi Amesen and Carlys Lemler for excellent research assistance. All errors are
my own.
Professor Kim earned a B.A. with distinction from Yale and a J.D., cum laude, from
Georgetown University Law Center, where she served as senior articles editor and member of the
executive board of the Georgetown JournalofGenderandthe Law.
After law school, she practiced law as a litigation associate with Weil, Gotshal & Manges in
New York and received the firm's Pro Bono Service Award. She served as a law clerk to the
Honorable Denny Chin of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
1.
See, e.g., EvAN WOLFSON, WHY MARRIAGE MATrERS: AMERICA, EQUALITY, AND GAY
PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO MARRY (2004); Thomas B. Stoddard, Why GayPeopleShould Seek the Right
To Many,in WE ARE EVERYwHERE (Mark Blasius & Shane Phelan eds., 1997).
2.
See, e.g.,
Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay
andLesbianMarnage Will Not 'Dismantle the Legal Structureof Genderin Every Marriage,"79
VA. L. REv. 1535 (1993); Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Lesbians and Gay Men Should Read Martha
Fineman,8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 167 (2000); Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When Is
Marriagea Path to Libertion in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE MORAL AND LEGAL DEBATE
(Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1997).
3.
See Katherine Franke, Longing forLoving, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 2685 (2008).
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drawing attention to the gender-hierarchical and sexuality-normenforcing construction of traditional marriage. The pursuit of same-sex
marriage and the resistance to it on the right shed light on the extent to
which marriage has tended to bear its privileged status because of its
exclusionary, heterosexual, and heteronormative construction, rather than
just in spite of it. The debate over same-sex marriage, accordingly, forces
reconsideration of the privileged status of marriage, on gender- and
sexuality-related hierarchy and exclusion. By shaking the foundations of
marriage's traditional predominance, the pursuit of same-sex marriage
bears the potential to open the way for more pluralistic and inclusive
understandings of family.
According to the feminist critique, marriage both reflects and
reinforces gender differences and hierarchy through its operation and
consequences of exit.' As Nancy Cott has observed, "[M]arriage
uniquely and powerfully influences the way differences between the
sexes are conveyed and symbolized. So far as it is a public institution, it
is the vehicle through which the apparatus of the state can shape the
gender order."6
While many feminist and lesbian and gay rights scholars have
criticized traditional marriage's gendered and heteronormative
framework, contemporary arguments from the right against same-sex
marriage also demonstrate how marriage has been constructed-and
embraced-as a gender-enforcement mechanism in law and society.
For example, the "definitional" argument against same-sex
marriage-that marriage is "between a man and a woman"--provides an
opportunity to consider whether marriage's perceived social value rests to
a large degree on this gender function. To use Susan Appleton's phrase,
the definitional argument reveals quite tellingly how much marriage is
about "gender talk."7
While for feminists, the gender function of marriage is a reason to
criticize marriage, for those who oppose same-sex marriage, the gender
function of marriage may be understood not only as an important side4.
See Twila L. Perry, The "EssentialsofMarniage" Reconsideringthe Duty ofSupport
and Services, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2003) (exploring the gendered nature of marital
duties).
5.
See Alicia Brokars Kelly, RehabilitatingPartneishipMariageas a Theory of Wealth
DistributionatDivorce: In Recogtion ofa SharedLife, 19 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 141, 170 (2004)
(arguing that modem divorce law has "systematically devalued the contributions of women,
particularly home labor").
6.

NANCY E Cor, PUBLIC Vows: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 3 (2002);

see also Susan Appleton, Missing in Action? Searching for Gender Talk in the Same-Sex
MarnageDebate, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 98, 110-11 (2005).
7.
See Appleton, supra note 6, at 98.
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effect of marriage but also an intrinsic part of its appeal. The argument
against same-sex marriage has focused to a significant degree on the role
that marriage, as traditionally constituted, has played in promoting
conventional gender roles.8 The gender function of traditional marriage
is best summed up by the following "fact" about "counterfeit marriage"
offered by the Family Research Council: "Homosexual marriage is an
empty pretense that lacks the fundamental sexual complementariness of
male and female."9
For many, the value of marriage also lies significantly in its
exclusionary nature, limited to those who fit within its gendered and
hetero-normative paradigm. According to Susan Appleton, "Those who
seek federal and state constitutional amendments to restrict marriage to
'one man and one woman' often describe their goal as 'preserving' or
'protecting' marriage. For example, in calling for a constitutional
amendment, President Bush cited the need 'to protect marriage in
America.""'
The language of protectionism and preservation that pervades the
opposition to same-sex marriage presupposes a limited pool of marital
privilege." For example, former U.S. Senator Rick Santorum has argued
that it is important to consider the impact on the "entire moral ecology of
our country" from allowing same-sex marriage.
Santorum likens
support of same-sex marriage to "people argu[ing] that we can build the
equivalent of a strip mall without even thinking about what those
consequences are."' 3
Those "consequences" are the putative devaluation of marriage. In
the eyes of same-sex marriage opponents, opening up marriage to samesex couples means "taking away" marriage from heterosexuals. In
Santorum's view, the heterosexual, gendered, and exclusive nature of
marriage comprises its value.' 4 To allow same-sex marriage is to
"deconstruct[] marriage" and "devalue what you want to value."'"
8.
See Deborah A. Widiss et al., Exposing Sex Stereotypes in Recent Same-Sex
Marriage Jurisprudence,30 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 461 (2007).
9.
Timothy J. Dailey, Family Research Council, In Focus: Ten Facts About Counterfeit
Marriage, http://www.frc.org/content/ten-facts-about-same-sex-marriage (last visited Aug. 4, 2009).
10. Appleton, supranote 6, at 126-27.
11.
Id.
at 126.
12. An Argument Against Same-Sex Marriage: An Interview by David Masci with Rick
Santornm, Senior Fellow, Ethics & Pub. Policy Ctr. (Apr. 24, 2008), http://pewforum.org/events/?
EventID= 180.
13. Id
13.
Id.
14. Seeid
15. Id.
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In other words, marriage traditionally has been meaningful to samesex marriage opponents because it has been constructed as an "elite
private club"' 6 insofar as "the value of membership depreciates if just
anyone-particularly outsiders like gays and lesbians--can join."'7
Marriage's coveted status for many of its truest believers lies in the
distinguishing function it performs in dividing those worthy of its
privileges and benefits from those who are not. This division has
powerful and painful effects. It bears serious consequences for those, gay
and straight, who live outside of marriage. 8 For same-sex marriage
opponents, this discipline is part of marriage's importance.
For same-sex marriage opponents, the best way to save marriage is
not to encourage it widely, but to continue to conserve it for the benefit
of those who fit its traditional gender and sexuality paradigms. On this
view, overuse threatens the institutional species of marriage." The point
of marriage for these opponents is its exclusionary and limited nature.
A rich and still-developing literature informs us about the promise
same-sex marriage holds for transforming gender relations within
marriage." But how can same-sex marriage transform the status of
marriage within law and society more broadly?2 ' As Martha Fineman
has discussed, marriage is privileged as the primary way of addressing
dependency.22 The intense focus on marriage as a means of privatizing
care, however, leaves out vast reaches of the population and marginalizes
those who are not married.
The pursuit of same-sex marriage promises to unsettle the primacy
of traditional marriage within the social and legal landscape concerning
family. The counterarguments to same-sex marriage, as based on gender
and exclusion, highlight the extent to which the predominance of
traditional marriage may not just be incidental to the gender-enforcement
and exclusionary aspects of marriage as traditionally constituted, but
16.
17.
18.

Appleton, supranote 6, at 127.
Id.
See, eg, MARTHA FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH (2004); NANCY POLIKOFF,
BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (2008);
Laura Rosenbury, Friends With Benefits, 106 MICH. L. REv. 189 (2007); Rachel E Moran, How
Second-Wave FeminismForgotthe Single Woman, 33 HOFSTRA L. REv. 223 (2004).
19.
Lynn Wardle has analogized the prospect of same-sex marriage to the "tragedy of the
commons." Lynn D. Wardle, A Response to the "Conservative Case" for Same-Sex Marriage:
Same-Sex Marriageand "the Tragedy ofthe Commons,"22 BYU J. PUB.L. 441, 470-72 (2008).

20.

See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, Marriage,Law,and Gender: A FeministInquiry, 1 TUL. J.L.

& SEXUALITY 9 (1991); William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Social ConstructionistCritique ofPosnerJ

Sex andReason: Steps Towarda GaylegalAgenA 102 YALE L.J. 333, 356 (1992).
21.
Appleton, supra note 6, at 124 ("And how might same-sex marriage help transform
marriage (or its place in law and society) for heterosexuals?").
22.

SeeFrNEMAN, supanote 18.
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might actually be the sine quo non of marriage in its traditional form.23
Accordingly, the debate over same-sex marriage draws out the extent to
which marriage's primacy has significantly derived from its
discriminatory workings.
Same-sex marriage holds the potential not only to transform
marriage internally but also to alter marriage's "place in law and
society."24 Marriage skepticism has principally focused on the ways in
which marriage has functioned socially and legally to create and enforce
hierarchy-both within the institution of marriage and across the
spectrum of intimate and caregiving relationships.
Rooted in this marriage skepticism is a concern about socially and
legally supporting a diverse array of caretaking and intimate
relationships, beyond the conjugal relationships that have been
traditionally idealized as between men and women.
Marriage
skepticism, accordingly, may be viewed as a project in pluralism.
The pursuit of same-sex marriage facilitates pluralism by shining a
light on the nature and origins of traditional marriage's privileged status.
By doing so, it opens the path toward challenging its primacy and
considering, instead, additional means of supporting family, intimacy,
and caretaking beyond just marriage. In other words, we may make
marriage matter less ultimately as the principal and privileged means of
supporting caregiving by making it matter more now as a civil rights
goal.

23. I am not, for example, persuaded that traditional marriage's staying power all these
years has been just about more benign aspirations like love and commitment. The voluminous
research on the significance of marriage to women's social, economic, and political power
demonstrates that love and commitment have not principally driven women to marry. See, e.g.,
Corr, supm note 6; STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY (2005). Moreover, the increase
in rates of divorce and delays in women's age at the time of marriage coincide with increased
workforce participation by women and greater opportunities in higher education. See NAT'L
COMM'N ON CHILDREN, BEYOND RHETORIC:

A NEW AMERICAN AGENDA FOR CHILDREN AND

FAMILIES 21-23 (1991). These demographic trends suggest that marriage is not just about love
and commitment.
24. Appleton, supra note 6, at 124 ("And how might same-sex marriage help transform
marriage (or its place in law and society) for heterosexuals?").
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VIEWING LAW AS CULTURAL POLITICS INTHE
PROMOTION OF GAY EQUALITY

Steven J. Macias*
Rather than a new jurisprudential theory about gay rights, what we
need is a new realization that the possibility of LGBT equality lays
squarely within the domain of cultural politics. We need to understand
that equal and respectful treatment of gay men and lesbians will only
come about because sociocultural practices will have changed for the
better, not because a new "due process" or "equal protection" argument
has been invented. This is not to suggest that there is no room for
lawyers and legal scholars at the gay strategy table, for surely there is.
Instead, conceiving of the quest for gay inclusiveness as primarily a
sociopolitical goal, and not as a doctrinal or jurisprudential goal, means
recognizing that the judicial process occurs within a larger sphere of
cultural politics. Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule curiously miss this
point in a recent review article.'
According to Posner and Vermeule, progressive legal scholars lack
the coherent theoretical program of conservative activists.2 They further
contend that it is the want of a liberal programmatic theory that explains
conservative dominance, not only at the highest levels of the judiciary,
but also in the public mind.3 The coherence of originalism, they believe,
has contributed to its sociolegal ubiquity.' Their review criticizes a
collection of "progressive" essays as follows: "Common to nearly all the
authors are two commitments-a commitment to using law to promote a
progressive political agenda, and a commitment to public candor about
the first commitment; but these are incompatible, at least in pragmatic
terms."' Although I can appreciate their instinct that the public mind as
well as the professional legal mind will not accept a law-as-politics
formulation, I believe that there is a third option. Between formal legal
*
© 2010 Steven J. Macias. Teaching Fellow, California Western School of Law.
Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law 2010-11. I welcome comments
at macias@stanfordalumni.org or smacias@cwsl.edu.
1.
Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Outcomes, Outcomes, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 12,
2009, 43 (reviewing THE CONSTITUTION IN2020 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009)),
available at http://www.tnr.com/article/books/outcomes-outcomes?page=0,0. Although I do not
share their conclusion that "political programs must draw their strength from theoretical
innovation, and not the other way around," Posner and Vermeule make a good case that the essays
under review lack a certain political savvy. Id at 47.
2.
See id.
3.
Id
4.
Id.
at 43-44.
Id.
47.
5.
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theory-laden doctrine and unadorned legal instrumentalism lies the real
pragmatic view: law as cultural politics.6
Viewing law as cultural politics means several things. First, it
means that those who strive for cultural change, including gay rights
activists, must communicate with the bench and bar on emotionalsympathetic and empathetic-levels.' Decision makers must understand
and identify with the human pain and suffering caused by unequal laws.
Without such identification, a judge's cultural view is necessarily limited,
thus leading to narrow, conservative decisions, regardless of the judge's
jurisprudential stripes.
The second pragmatic insight follows from this last observation:
gay rights activists need not worry about the theoretical preferences of
the judges, and thus need not argue with them in theoretical terms. If a
judge has empathy for gay citizens, whether she is a law-and-order judge,
an originalist, a strict constructionist, or merely just trying to avoid being
reversed on appeal, she will rule in favor of gay equality. The judge
whose cultural milieu is large enough to understand that sexuality-based
distinctions serve no useful public purpose, but instead work real harm,
will find her preferred theory of interpretation malleable enough to
include gays and lesbians as equal citizens.
The third and final insight, and the one that the rest of this Essay is
designed to illuminate, is that arguing the case for gay equality in either
theoretical or doctrinal terms, without full empathy from the bench, will
more often than not lead to confusion and loss. As Stanley Fish has
explained, "the liberal tendency to turn substantive convictions into
formal abstractions" distracts from accomplishing one's political goal by
making the goal seem larger than it actually is.8 This is what happened in

6.
I mean to use the phrase "cultural politics" as Richard Rorty did. "The term 'cultural
politics' covers, among other things, arguments about what words to use.... It includes projects
for getting rid of whole topics of discourse." RiCHARD RORTY, CulturalPolitics and the Question
of the Existence of God M 4 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS: PHILOSOPHY AS CULTURAL PoLrrmcs 3, 3
(2007). For my purposes, "law as cultural politics" means teaching the legal establishment that its
current conceptions of "gay" "homosexual" and "sexual orientation" do not match up well with
how actual gay persons conceive of themselves as individuals.
7.
Martha Nussbaum captures this sentiment well in the Preface to her new work on
sexuality and law. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION
AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, at xvii (2010). There, she explains that the "politics of disgust" has

been the prevailing lens through which the majority views issues of sexual orientation. Id. By
contrast, Nussbaum argues for a "politics of humanity." Id Disgust can prevail "only if one has
never made a serious good-faith attempt to see the world through that person's eyes or to
experience that person's feelings." Id. In order to turn from a politics of disgust to one of
humanity, we need an "exercise of imagination." Id
8.

STANLEY FISH, THE TROUBLE WITH PRINCIPLE 149 (1999).
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the Proposition 8 (Prop. 8) case in the California Supreme Court.!
Opponents of Prop. 8, including the state attorney general, argued that
the outcome of the case depended on the intricacies of separation of
powers, the complexities of constitutional amendment-revision
distinctions, and the scope of prepolitical natural law, rather than simply
fair treatment of people."0 But because six of the seven justices really did
not consider gays and lesbians to be worthy of equality, they took up the
opponents' challenge and discussed the case as though principles, and
not people, were all that mattered."
Proposition 8, now part of the California Constitution, contains a
mere fourteen words: "Only marriage between a man and a woman is
valid or recognized in California."'2 This sentence takes its place in the
constitution immediately after the section containing the equal protection
clause, thus implying a limitation on the concept of equality. In its famed
2008 opinion, the California Supreme Court interpreted the equal
protection clause as prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in the
state's marriage scheme. 3 Attorney General Jerry Brown, in arguing for
the invalidation of Prop. 8, put forth the argument that the framers of
California's constitution, never intended "to subject the rights of
individuals or groups ... to abrogation by popular vote-raising the

specter of Mills's [sic] 'tyranny of the majority.""4. Within the same
section of his brief, Brown outlines a theory of prepolitical fundamental
rights and discusses a social contract theory of government,' neither of
9.
Strauss v. Horton, 207 R3d 48 (Cal. 2009).
10. SeeAnswer Brief in Response to Petition for Extraordinary Relief, Tyler v. California,
No. S168066 (Cal. 2009) [hereinafter Brief in Response], available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.
gov/courts/supreme/highprofile/documents/s 168066-answer-brief-petition.pdf.
11.
See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P3d 384 (Cal. 2008). Certainly the four members of
the court who legalized gay marriage prior to Proposition 8 had a certain amount of sympathy for
gay people. But it turned out that three of those four justices had no empathy for gays and
lesbians. Like a houseguest who sees a stray dog on a rainy day, the court initially brought the
dog inside, dried him off and warmed him up--because they felt sorry for him. But when the
owner objected to a strange dog inside his house, the court sent the dog back outside to face the
elements alone. Indeed, it appears that the three judges who switched sides post-Prop. 8 had
merely condescended to gays and lesbians in their first opinion, and perhaps that is all they could
do given their limited cultural vocabulary. Cf Richard Rorty, Feminism and Pragmatism,30
MICH. Q. REv. 231, 232, 249 (1991). In explaining that marginalized groups need to give up on
the vocabulary used to marginalize them, Rorty suggests that "we have to think of gays, blacks,
and women inventing themselves rather than discovering themselves, and thus of the larger
society as coming to terms with something new." Id. Hence, he praises feminist legal scholar
Catherine MacKinnon, who "sees moral and legal principles, particularly those phrased in terms
of equal rights, as impotent to change [intuitive] reactions." Id.
12. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5.
13. In reMarriages Cases, 183 P3d at 452-53.
14. Brief in Response, supra note 10, at 85.
15. Id. at 85-87.
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which theorist John Stuart Mill would have approved. The point,
however, is that none of this, whether intellectually consistent or not, was
enlightening to the court, or anyone else, as to why Prop. 8 should have
been invalidated. It should have been invalidated, and Mill could have
helped, but his political theory was the wrong place to turn.
Political theory, except in its most simplistic form, is not the stuff of
American legal briefs or opinions. Judges are not trained in political
theory and most, quite frankly, do not have the intellectual background to
evaluate the history of political thought when it is presented to them.16
Rather than framing the Prop. 8 case as one concerning prepolitical,
inalienable rights,'7 the Attorney General should have used Mill's On
Libert/ to explain why such a discriminatory law does not advance "the
good of the whole."' 9 Instead, the brief simply stated that to be the case,
and did so in the same breath as discussing ticket scalping, merchant
coupons, and insane asylums." But as pragmatist philosopher, Richard
Rorty, once said, "I would not consider myself to be seriously discussing
politics with my fellow-citizens if I simply quoted passages from Mill at
them, as opposed to using those passages to help me articulate my
views.... What should be discouraged is mere appeal to authority."2'
Rorty's statement is especially relevant when making an argument to a
state supreme court that essentially engages in policy analysis and for
whom authority has much less force.
Attorney General Brown used Mill as a rule of law from which the
court was supposed to deduce the logical outcome.
Mill's harm
principle and public/private distinction were simply the accepted major
premises upon which the judicial opinion was supposed to depend." Yet,
what successful Prop. 8 opponents needed to show, was not that the new
16. See, e.g.,
RICHARD A. POSNER, LAw, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 227 n.28 (2003).
In explaining how abstract political concepts can only confuse matters in legal opinions, Posner
observes, "Empty, sometimes naive or even fatuous, judicial remarks about democracy abound."
17. See Brief in Response, supra note 10, at 79-80 (discussing "inalienable" rights, which
"'antedate' the constitution as inherent in human nature").
18.

JOHN STUART MILL,ON LIBERTY (1859).

19. Brief in Response, supra note 10, at 80.
20. See id
21. Richard Rorty, Religion inthe Public Square: A Reconsideration,31 J.RELIGIOUS
ETHIcs 141, 147 (2003). On Rorty's contribution to law, see Steven J.Macias, Rorty,
Pragmatism,and Gaylaw A Eulogy, a Celebration,anda Thumpl 77 UMKC L. REv. 85 (2008);
Ian Ward, Bncolage and Low Cunning: Rorty on Pragmatism,Politics and Poetic Justice, 28
LEGAL STUD. 281 (2008).

22.
23.

See Brief in Response, supra note 10, at 85.
Richard Rorty, Pragmatism as Romantic Polytheism, in THE REVIVAL OF

PRAGMATISM: NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAW, AND CULTURE 21 (Morris Dickstein ed.,

1998).
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constitutional provision was intellectually irresponsible by ignoring
natural rights, but morally irresponsible by "circumvent[ing] the process
2
of achieving democratic consensus about how to maximize happiness., 1
Continuing with Rorty's argument, Prop. 8 proponents "sin not by
ignoring Mill's inductive methods, but by ignoring his reflection on
liberty."25 Likewise, a pragmatic and morally responsible California
Supreme Court would have demanded more from anti-marriage
proponents than the simple fact of their 52.3% showing at the ballot
box. 6 Both sides must engage in reasoned debate, at least in the
courtroom.27

Attorney General Brown's brief only hints at what a pragmatic
analysis of Prop. 8 might look like by suggesting that the court subject it
to a "compelling need" test.28 A better inquiry might be whether limiting
marriage to cross-sex couples is a project of social cooperation or a
project of individual self-development. 9 In other words, does Prop. 8
make a difference primarily in our social interactions or primarily in our
personal self-conceptions?
Judge Posner asks us to consider a version of this question by
examining whether gay marriage will "degrade or depreciate the concept
of marriage," thus lowering the marriage rate "with adverse social
consequences."3 According to Posner, "the danger seems small" because
"the people who worry about the effect of gay marriage on the institution
of marriage are those most committed to the institution, and they are
unlikely to desert it."3 Even if they did, Posner reasons that the
privatization of marriage would not have major social consequences
24. Id.
at 29.
25. Id.
26. Supplement to the Statement of Vote Statewide Summary by County for State Ballot
Measures (Nov. 4, 2008), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ssov/10-ballot-measuresstatewide-summary-by-county.pdf.
27. In upholding Prop. 8, the court defended the prerogative of the people as though their
vote reflected the outcome of a deliberative debate. See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P3d 48, 108 (Cal.
2009) ("[ Tihe people may amend the Constitution through the initiative process when they
conclude that a judicial interpretation or application of a preexisting constitutional provision
should be changed."). However, in a concurring opinion, Justice Kennard explained that
decisions of the voters need not be supported by a "compelling interest," nor as far as I can tell,
any publicly intelligible reason whatsoever. Id.
at 124 (Kennard, J., concurring).
28. Brief in Response, supra note 10, at 90 ("[T]he proponents of Proposition 8 advanced
no compelling need in furtherance of public health, safety, or welfare for abrogating the
fundamental rights of same-sex couples.").
29. Rorty, supanote 23, at 28.
30. Posting of Richard Posner to the Becker-Posner Blog, The Economics of Gay
Marriage, The Becker-Posner Blog, http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2008/08/theeconomics_o_8.html (Aug. 10, 2008).
31.
Id.
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"given the ease with which under modem law marriages can be dissolved
by either party."32
Posner has also recently said, in praising "judicial modesty" that it
would be a mistake if the United States Supreme Court "created a federal
constitutional right of homosexual marriage."" His primary reason,
however, was because
the question of whether to nationalize an issue in the name of the
Constitution calls for an exercise of judgment; and when the nation is
deeply divided over an issue to which the Constitution does not speak with
any clarity, and a uniform national policy would override differences in
local conditions, nationalization may be premature.34
In the case of Prop. 8, we were dealing not with a national, but
rather a state, issue. As Kenneth W Starr's brief explained, "California's
generous statutory protection for the civil rights of gays and lesbians
amply attest to their concern for minorities."" Therefore, the California
Supreme Court's "exercise of judgment" should have proceeded precisely
along the lines of Posner's consequentialist analysis, explaining to
otherwise tolerant Californians why the invalidation of Prop. 8 was
morally, and therefore legally, correct. That would have been a true
exercise in law as cultural politics. 6

32.
33.

Id
Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 32,

34.
34. Id. Even someone as sympathetic to equal marriage rights as Martha Nussbaum
recognizes that "Same-sex marriage is a good issue for federalism to handle, at least for a while."
NUSSBAUM, supra note 7, at 161.
35. Interveners' Response to Pages 75-90 of the Attorney General's Answer Brief at 19,
Strauss v. Horton, (Cal. 2009) (No. S168047), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/courts/
supreme/highprofile/documents/sl680xx-response-ag-brief.pdf.
36. Another name for "law as cultural politics" might be "postmodern justice," which
"requires... that in the process of deciding, the judge attend to the uniqueness of the other and in
doing so suspend and reinvent the law." Peter Goodrich, Postmodern Justice, iOLAW AND THE
HuMANrrrEs: AN INTRODUCnON 188, 204 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2010). In explaining what
postmodern justice looks like in action, Goodrich calls it "an instance of law's entry into the
multiplicity of language games." Id.at 208. Following these lines of thought, the Prop. 8 Court
might have disrupted the language game of democracy-a heterosexist game-in favor of a
language game that expanded the circle of those entitled to the law's protection. Because the
choice between these two language games is far from settled, the gay-rights lawyers have to
convince the judges to pick theirs. Perhaps that alternate language-the one in which gays are
fully formed human beings-is not yet complete (and I think it is not) and thus there are not
many courts willing to plays games with such a limited vocabulary. If that is the case, then the
agenda for LGBT legal academics is clear: strengthen the conception of the gay subject as a
rights-bearing human subject without outside (anti-gay) interference, then take the resultant
language game and play it up as often as possible. The hope is that eventually the judges (and
everyone else) will then play along.
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NEW ENTRANTS BRING NEW QUESTIONS

Douglas NeJaime*
A.

Introduction

In a relatively short period of time, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender (LGBT) movement has moved from the margins to the
center. The movement's push for equality has attracted the attentionboth sympathetic and oppositional--of important groups and individuals
outside of the movement. Christian Right advocates, on the one hand,
and government lawyers and private nonmovement lawyers, on the other,
now invest heavily in litigation implicating LGBT rights. This mainstreaming of the LGBT movement yields significant issues for sexual
orientation and gender identity scholars. In this Essay, I will first show
how the LGBT rights context provides rich new material with which to
explore decades-old debates and pressing new questions in sociolegal
scholarship. Then, I will explain how the addition of new voices and the
increasing acceptance of LGBT equality norms present significant
substantive issues relating to religious liberty and antidiscrimination law.'
B. Sociolegal Scholarshp--CauseLawyeing,Law and Social
Movements, andLegal Mobilization
The rise of the Christian Right legal movement and its increasing
attention to LGBT rights issues suggest critical questions that often have
been neglected in sociolegal scholarship. As an initial matter, the
literature on conservative cause lawyering is a domain from which sexual
orientation and gender identity scholars are largely absent Yet analysis
of conservative public interest lawyering is a worthwhile task. Christian
Right advocates frame LGBT issues in provocative and influential ways.
LGBT rights lawyers respond, unable to frame issues entirely on their
own terms. For instance, in California's Proposition 8 battle, Christian
© 2010 Douglas NeJaime. Associate Professor, Loyola Law School Los Angeles. I
am grateful for the thoughtful comments I received at the Section on Sexual Orientation and
Gender Identity panel at the 2010 AALS Conference. Many thanks go to Suzanne Goldberg for
organizing this important discussion, and to Dean Spade, for his insightful comments on this
Essay.
This short Essay attempts to highlight and pose some key questions for future legal
1.
scholarship on sexual orientation and gender identity. These highlights, of course, are colored by
my own research interests, and I want to acknowledge that a number of important and provocative
issues populate the field.
See ANN SoutrwoRTH, LAwYERS OF THE RIGHT (2008), for a thorough exploration of
2.
conservative cause lawyering.
*
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Right advocates connected marriage equality to gay-inclusive public
school curriculum, forcing Proposition 8 opponents to address both
issues.' LGBT advocates spent significant time and money responding
to the fears of parents with school-age children and, instead of embracing
gay-inclusive curriculum, largely dismissed the prospect of such
curriculum as far-fetched and irrelevant.'
How, then, do
countermovement frames affect movement messaging, priorities, and
resource allocation?
On a broader level, the relationship between the Christian Right and
LGBT rights movements provides a productive lens through which to
explore movement and countermovement phenomena. While most
scholarship on law and social movements conceptualizes movements
battling against the state,5 the intense relationship between the Christian
Right and LGBT rights movements illustrates the need to consider and
understand opposing movement relationships. How does the increasing
success of the LGBT movement facilitate Christian Right advocates'
appeal to minority rights claims? How does analysis of the Christian
Right/LGBT rights movement/countermovement relationship complicate
established theories of movement mobilization and organization?
The LGBT movement's very recent history has witnessed a trend
toward more sympathetic state actors, further underscoring how a simple
model in which a social movement opposes the state does not map neatly
onto LGBT rights. In fact, in the past year, top government lawyers from
California and Massachusetts have staked out significant pro-gay
positions. In the federal challenge to Proposition 8, the California
Attorney General argued that the state constitutional amendment is
unconstitutional under both federal due process and equal protection
guarantees.6 At the same time, the Massachusetts Attorney General
challenged part of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).7
Working with an earlier suit brought by Gay & Lesbian Advocates &
3.
See California General Election Official Voter Information Guide, Arguments: Prop
8(2008), http://www.voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2008/argu-rebut/argu-rebutt8.htm.
4.
See id.
5.
See David S. Meyer & Suzanne Staggenborg, Movements, Countermovements, and
the Sucture of Political Oppommity, 101 Am. J. Soc. 1628, 1629 (1996) ("Because most
empirical and theoretical work on social movements focuses on movement challenges to the state,
the phenomenon of ongoing interactions between opposing movements demands a revision and
extension of our theories of social movements and social change.").
6.
See Answer of Attorney General Edmund G. Brown Jr., Peny v Schwarzenegger
2009 WL 1748382 (N.D. Cal. May 22,2009) (No. 3:09-cv-02292-VRW).
7.
See Complaint, Commonwealth ofMass. v United StatesDep't ofHealth andHuman
Services, No. 1:2009-cv-1 1156 (D. Mass. July 8, 2009), http://www.boston.com/news/politics/
politicalintelligence/DOMA%20Complaint/o2OFINAL.pdf.
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Defenders (GLAD),8 the Massachusetts Attorney General argued that
DOMA unconstitutionally requires Massachusetts to treat similarly
situated couples differently.9 We can no longer consider the state to be
the opposition to LGBT rights claims; rather, LGBT and Christian Right
advocates each attempt to seize on openings offered by state actors
sympathetic to their respective movements. By reconceptualizing
movement dynamics in this way, I do not mean to cast the state as either
a centralized or benign actor. Rather, power operates in multiple, diffuse
ways across multiple institutional domains. How do the dynamics of
power across state institutions affect the political opportunity structure
available to the LGBT rights and Christian Right movements? How do
the changing relationships of state actors to each movement influence
how the respective movements use elite support to bring about social
change?
The new role that government lawyers have taken in pro-gay
litigation also complicates traditional cause lawyering analysis. While
the increasing presence of government lawyers in LGBT rights litigation
speaks to the progress of the movement, that same presence suggests a
potential shift away from a carefully orchestrated trajectory. In
challenging Proposition 8 in state court, the California Attorney General
put forth a novel theory, arguing that a simple majority of voters cannot
take away a fundamental right from a suspect class without a compelling
governmental interest."0 He expressly rejected the amendment/revision
theory advanced by LGBT rights lawyers." While the Attorney General's
opposition to the newly adopted constitutional amendment created a
significant moment in LGBT history, his legal position produced some
internal tension that those opposing Proposition 8 had to manage and
resolve. How do government lawyers who side with a social movement
negotiate their roles as public lawyers and cause lawyers? And how do
movement lawyers respond to sympathetic but independent government
lawyers?
The recent federal marriage equality lawsuit, brought by prominent
private lawyers against the advice of movement advocates, casts in even

8.
See Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, or Other Relief and for Review of Agency
Action, Gill v Office of PersonnelManagement (D. Mass. Mar. 3, 2009), http://www.glad.org/
uploads/docs/cases/gill-complaint-03-03-09.pdf.
9.
Complaint, No. 1:2009-cv-l 1156, supra note 7, at 3-4.
10.
See Answer Brief in Response to Petition for Extraordinary Relief, Tyler v State of
California,No. 5168066 (Cal. S. Ct. Dec. 19, 2008), http://www.courfinfo.ca.gov/courts/supreme/
highprofile/documents/S 168066-answer-brief-petition.pdf
11.
See id. at 22-53.
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starker relief the threat to social movement control.'2 David Boies and
Ted Olson, supported by the newly formed American Foundation for
Equal Rights, took decisive action ahead of the organized movement's
timeline.' 3 Their federal suit challenging Proposition 8 provides further
evidence of the mainstream-ing of LGBT equality norms. The unlikely
marriage of two ideological rivals presents the question of marriage
equality as a nonpartisan matter of basic fairness. And it attests to the
success of the LGBT rights movement. But for work on cause lawyering
and legal mobilization,'4 the suit presents provocative questions regarding
movement control. How do movement lawyers maintain control of
strategy? How might elite support-a key indirect effect in the legal
mobilization framework-actually threaten a movement's cause? How
do advocates react to loss of control at the hands of supportive elites?
And how does the move by Boies and Olson tell us about the risks and
benefits of court-centered strategies in LGBT rights work? Might
reliance on litigation without adequate popular support jeopardize the
movement's progress?
While the LGBT rights domain provides experiences that pose
pressing new questions on cause lawyering and law and social
movements, it also presents new material to explore classic debates in
sociolegal theory. In fact, many scholars are looking to the LGBT rights
movement for rich new data with which to assess the effectiveness of
litigation and the role of lawyers in social movements.'5 Recent
experiences with marriage equality litigation provide empirical evidence
that speaks to the place of litigation in social change campaigns and to
the strategic moves of activist lawyers.' 6 Furthermore, exploring the
movement and countermovement relationships between LGBT rights
advocates and Christian Right advocates might have significant
implications for theorizing social movement lawyers' roles and
determining the effectiveness of litigation strategies. Within the legal
mobilization framework, what have been the indirect effects of marriage
equality litigation? How have both LGBT and Christian Right advocates
12. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 592 E3d 971 (9th Cir. 2009).
13. See Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, or Other Relief, Perryv Schwazenegger,
2009 WL 1490740 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2009) (No. CV-092292VRW).
14. See, e.g., MICHAEL W MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE
PoLmcs OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994).
15. See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, LawyeringforManageEquality,
57 UCLA L. REv. (forthcoming 2010).
16. Compare GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? (2008), with Thomas M. Keck, Beyond Backlash: Assessing the Impact of
JudicialDecisionson LGBTRfghts, 43 L. & SOC'Y REv. 151 (2009).
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conceptualized litigation, and how much have they affirmatively turned
to courts for social change?
C. AntidiscriminationandReligious Liberty
Some of the same new entrants who present significant questions
for sociolegal scholarship also affect the substantive doctrinal issues
facing sexual orientation and gender identity scholars. Christian Right
advocates have successfully pushed antigay initiatives across the country.
Sexual orientation scholars must address how such laws, which strike at
the heart of lesbian and gay families, contravene foundational
constitutional protections. How does Arkansas's Act 1, which prohibits
unmarried cohabiting couples from fostering or adopting children, 7 deny
equal protection of the law, invade privacy and freedom of intimate
association, and strike at parental rights of LGBT individuals? And how
does it do the same to other individuals who fail to meet entrenched
notions of the married, heterosexual, nuclear family? Moreover, how
does Act 1-and a host of other ballot initiatives across the countrydistort the political process and complicate our conceptualization of
direct democracy?
At the same time, Christian Right advocates have been forced to
become more defensive. With government actors increasingly adopting
LGBT equality norms (and displacing discrimination norms), Christian
Right advocates must react. As LGBT rights are achieved, the contours
of those rights must be determined. Such determinates will often turn on
the operation of religious objections. How will religious exemptions
carve out exceptions to LGBT rights? How will religious free exercise
and expressive association influence the meaning of sexual orientation
and gender identity nondiscrimination?
The push for religious accommodation by Christian Right lawyers
illuminates the importance of substantive issues underexplored and
under-theorized by sexual orientation and gender identity scholars.
While some religious liberty advocates might exaggerate the extent to
which LGBT rights threaten religious freedom, the conflict is real.
Indeed, as marriage equality has moved from an impossibility to a reality,
some state lawmakers have taken up the task of balancing the rights of
same-sex couples to marry against the rights of religious groups and

17.
See Lynda Altman, Editorial, Arkansas' Act I Limts Foster Care, Adoption to
Married Couples Only (Oct. 23, 2008), http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/1137116/
Arkansas act 1_limits fostercareadoption.html?cat-17.
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individuals not to recognize such marriages." Most of the scholars
weighing in on these questions come from the law and religion field.
While some sexual orientation scholars, most notably Chai Feldblum and
Andrew Koppelman, do an admirable job of articulating normative
positions in favor of LGBT equality while providing careful (but
divergent) analyses of religious objections, more voices are needed.'9
This conflict and its resolution will surely pervade the field for years to
come, and it would be wise for sexual orientation and gender identity
scholars to turn their attention to it. Our careful analysis, with its due
respect for the rights of LGBT individuals, will add an important
perspective to the scholarly debate and offer an essential contribution to
future legislative efforts. Of course, even as we maintain a normative
commitment to LGBT rights, we must acknowledge the importance of
religious liberty; in fact, we must take to the question of religious
accommodation the very solicitude for minority rights that informs
sexual orientation and gender identity scholarship. How are religion- and
LGBT-based identities similar? How do they manifest themselves in
modes of public expression? How can courts and legislatures clearly
articulate LGBT equality norms and yet also respect and accommodate
sincere religious objections?
D

Conclusion

We have reached a pivotal moment in sexual orientation and gender
identity work. We are not simply speaking to each other. Others are
paying attention. Christian Right advocates have devoted significant
attention to our issues. Government lawyers are now taking up our
cause. And private lawyers on both sides of the aisle are defending our
rights. But with these new players come new empirical, theoretical, and
doctrinal questions. We should address such questions head-on: How
have Christian Right lawyers changed our understanding of cause
lawyering? How does the relationship between the Christian Right and
LGBT rights movements inform work on law and social movements?
How do sympathetic government lawyers and private nonmovement
lawyers complicate our definition of cause lawyers and threaten
movement lawyer control? How do the recent experiences of LGBT
18.

See, e.g., Kevin Landrigan, Religion Clause Added to Gay Marriage Proposal,

NASHUA TELEGRAPH (N.H.), May 30, 2009, at Al.

19. See, e.g., Chai R. Feldblum, Moml Conflict and Liberty. Gay Rights and Reigion,
"y
72 BROOK. L. REv. 61 (2006); Andrew Koppelman, You Can't Huny Love:
Antidiscimination Protectionsfor Gay People ShouldHaveReligious Exemptions, 72 BROOK. L.
REv. 125 (2006).
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rights litigation shed light on debates regarding the effectiveness of courtcentered strategies? How do efforts by the Christian Right test our
notions of equality and liberty? How do they challenge our ideals about
the political process and the judiciary's role in protecting minority
groups? And how do they pose difficult questions of religious freedom,
antidiscrimination, and minority rights?
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PLACE, SPACE, AND TERRITORY AS FRONTIERS
FOR LGBTQ SCHOLARSHIP

Marc R. Poirier*
I weary of scholarly arguments about the interests of LGBTQ folk
that are framed primarily in terms of equality, fundamental rights,
privacy, First Amendment speech, dignity, equal citizenship, and the like.
To be sure, this is the broad speech of constitutional doctrine, and
therefore it is powerful when adopted by an authorized decision maker,
whether judicial or legislative. Constitutional doctrine serves litigators,
who must frame their arguments in its terms to persuade judges, or to
provide judges with a legitimating vocabulary in which to articulate
decisions reached for other reasons. Scholars can help muster and sort
doctrinal constitutional arguments. But we should not limit ourselves to
them.
Constitutional-level analysis standing alone often does little to
explain how experiences of equality, inequality, dignity, insult, etc. arise;
nor does it encourage us to investigate the pervasive and often subtle
mechanisms of identity, including asking how we might use identity
processes to alter structures of dominance and subordination.
Constitutional analysis can lack adequate attention to the dynamics of
individual identity as it is experienced, produced, and reproduced in
everyday life through our microinteractions with one another.'
Microinteractions also reproduce power relations-normal and

*
© 2010 Marc R. Poirier. Professor Poirier holds a B.A. magna cum laude from Yale
University, a J.D. cur laude from Harvard Law School, and an LL.M. from Yale Law School.
Professor Poirier has taught at Seton Hall University School of Law in Newark, New Jersey, since
1991. He teaches law and sexuality, property law, administrative law, environmental law, and First
Amendment. His current scholarly interests include the regulation of same-sex couples, property
theory, cultural property, and the tension between religious freedom claims and antidiscrimination
laws. Two of his articles have won Dukeminier Awards as among the best scholarship in the field
of law and sexuality: The CulturalPropertyClaim Within the Same-Sex Mariage Controvemsy
(2008), and Hastening the Kultw-kampf: Boy Scouts of America v. Dale and the Politics of
American Masculinity (2003). Professor Poirier has served as Chair of two Sections of the
Association of American Law Schools-Property and Law Interpretation. He is an active
member of the Society of American Law Teachers Gay and Lesbian Concerns Committee. He
served from 1994-2006 on the Board of Diamond Metta New York Area Lesbian and Gay
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licensing and other energy regulatory matters.
I.
Sociologist Erving Goffiman's work bristles with insights about microinteractions and
identity. In particular, see ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE
(1959); Erving Goffman, TheInteraction Order,48 AM. Soc. REv. 1 (1983).
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stigmatized status, to use sociologist Erving Goffman's terms,2 or
dominance and subordination, to use terms common to critical race
theory and feminist theory. To be sure, as feminist theorists and othersincluding Goffman-have pointed out, identity performances can deviate
and transgress, potentially (although not always) shifting the shared
interpretive frame within which identities are (re)produced and
understood.'
Investigating microinteractions is not new to legal scholarship.
Early critical race theorists articulated the insult that comes from
"microaggressions" 4 and the need to understand the injury of race
discrimination in terms of how small interactions are interpreted and
internalized.'
Feminists developed cogent critiques of everyday
interactions, speech, and "private" institutions, as processes of
subordination. Mechanisms of cognitive bias have been explored by
legal scholars relying on psychologists and sociologists, leading to an
increasing focus on relational approaches to remedying discrimination.'
Recently I put this literature to use, arguing that the injury in the "civil
union/marriage" distinction can be understood as the state's legitimation
of a widespread differentiating linguistic practice, which tends to
perpetuate preexisting cognitive stereotypes and biases.7
Increased contact among groups can play a vital part in prejudice
reduction. But it does so in a far more complex way that the naive
"contact hypothesis" articulated fifty years ago by Gordon W Allport.8
2.

ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA:

NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOIRED IDENTITY

(1963); see also Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 772-73 (2002) (restating Goffian's
arguments about conversion, passing, and covering in a contemporary legal and sociological
context that includes LGBTQ folk and their microinteractions).
3.
See, e.g., Marc R. Poirier, Microperformancesofldentty: Visible Same-Sex Couples
and the Maniage Controversy, 15 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & Soc. JUST. 3, 21-23 (2008) (discussing
how individual microperformances can shift the shared frame within which identity performances
are interpreted, with specific reference to Goffman).
4.
See, e.g., Peggy C. Davis, Law as Mcroaggression,98 YALE L.J. 1559 (1989); Daniel
Sol6rzano et al., Keeping Race in Place;RacialMicroaggressionsand CampusRacialClimate at
the Universityof California Berkeley, 23 CHICANO-LATiNO L. REv. 15, 15-17 (2002) (discussing
Dr. Charles Pierce's psychological theories of race and microaggression).
5.
See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The 14 the Ego, andEqualProtection: Reckoning
with UnconsciousRacism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987).
6.
Classic analyses include Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories. A
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity 47 STAN. L.
REv. 1161 (1995); Lawrence, supra note 5. See Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Four
Measures A BehavioralRealistRevision of'Affirmative Action, "94 CAL. L. REv. 1063 (2006),
for a recent assessment. See Tristin K. Green & Alexandra Kalev, Discrimination-Reducing
Measuresat the RelationalLevel, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1435 (2008), for practical applications.
7.
Marc R. Poirier, Name Calling: Identifying Stgma and the "Civil Union"
"Marnage"Distinction,
41 CONN. L. REV. 1425 (2009).
8.

GORDON W ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954).
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Interpersonal contact shifts social practice under specific conditions.
These can be studied, understood, and then carefully fostered through
appropriate policies and institutional design. I am not sure that LGBTQ
scholars have fully realized the import of this literature
And yet attempts to shift identity status frames crop up all the time.
I recently learned that the United Kingdom has an antibullying program
for elementary schools, with an educational component that includes
newly penned jump rope rhymes, along the lines of "My gay uncle is
green, your gay uncle is blue.""' This strikes me as brilliant, an approach
that familiarizes children with gay identity in a nonthreatening,
desexualized way. The rhymes are, to use Jerry Kang's term, LGBTQ
"Trojan Horses.""
Traditionalists would surely object to these nursery rhymes as leftwing propaganda, and would claim that they interfere with parents' right
to choose the proper (moral) education for their children. Many a battle
over school curriculum, school or public library holdings, internet
indecency, and sex education shapes up along just these lines. For
identity is ineluctably shared. It is not individual, make no mistake, just
as visibility is shared, indeed as any meaning-making resource is shared.
Identity implicates social meaning. And because meaning is in common,
its (re)production is subject to battles for control.' 2
This brings us to visibility. Indisputably, visibility has been key to
the rapid shift in Western culture around the status of homosexuality.
And LGBTQ strategists seem to return to visibility tactics when all else
fails. The reversal represented by the success of California's Proposition
8 and the looming "lavender ceiling" for relationship recognition have
triggered a "conversation strategy."' 3 LGBTQ folk are being encouraged

9.
I wonder whether the recently developed, plausible claim that disgust, not fear, drives
antihomosexual emotions means that mechanisms of prejudice reduction that are effective in
other contexts will be ineffective here. Some folks may always experience instinctive disgust at
sex and bodies; contact may not be able to fix that. See generallyMARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM
DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (2010).
10. Interview with Federico Podeschi, Managing Dir., LGBT Excellence Ctr. Wales &
LGBT Cymru (Mar. 2009).
11. Jerry Kang, Trojan HorsesofRace, 118 HARv. L. REv. 1489, 1497 (2005).
12. Thus, I have argued that the traditionalist position on same-sex marriage could be
conceived of as a cultural property claim to an intangible cultural resource. Marc R. Poirier, The
CulturalPropertyClaim Within the Same-Sex MarrageControversy,17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
343 (2008).
13. See ACLU, Make Change, Not Lawsuits (2009), http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/lgbt/
makechange_20090527.pdf. For an analysis of this strategy in terms of the transformative
potential of microperformances of identity, see Poirier, supra note 3, at 59-68.
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to talk to friends and relatives about marriage, but notto sue for rights."
The leading advocacy groups thus seek to produce a widespread
educational effort diffusely, through interactions at the micro level.
LGBTQ visibility can be tricky, however. My first close-up view of
LGBTQ politics was the 1979 March on Washington. 5 March
organizers sought a particular kind of visibility in order to lay claim to
normal status. They appropriated the tradition of Martin Luther King's
1963 March on Washington by planning a national civil rights march in
the same location. The March comprised a transgressive performance of
visibility; yet its organizers sought to control whatever else might be
visibly associated with the March.' They worried about transvestites,
motorcycle dykes, topless women, and leather S/M fetishists. Should
these folks be allowed to march? If not, how to stop them?
So it is not enough to focus on identity and visibility. We scholars
must also address control of places and spaces because microinteractions
are physical.17 They occur in specific places and/or via specific
discursive spaces. In Hurley v Irish-American Gay,Lesbian, & Bisexual
Group of Boston, for example, the United States Supreme Court used
First Amendment doctrine to assign a property-like right to exclude to
the parade organizers, allocating control over a real place (Boston streets)
and a specific discursive space (the date, time, and location of the
traditional St. Patrick's Day Parade). 8
My title mentions "territory" as well as "place" and "space."
"Territory" involves continuing control of place/space by a culturally
cohesive group. I have not discussed "territory" previously in my work;
but the concept is implicit in my analysis of the failure of traditional

14. There is also a parallel effort to encourage LGBTQ folk to go beyond coming out and
to be more articulate to friends and family about what it is like to be LGBTQ. See, e.g., Tell3
Homepage, http://www.tell-three.org (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
15.
See The Rainbow History Project, The March on Washington, http://www.rainbow
history.org/mow79.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2010). I was not an organizer. I lived in
Washington, volunteered to help, and wound up being one of three Grand Security Marshalls on
the day of the March.
16.
See id.
Whenever stigmatized identity is at issue, we should "ask the place/space question."
17.
Marc R. Poirier, Gender,Place,DiscursiveSpace. Where is Same-Sex Marriage?,3 FLA. INT'L U.
L. REv. 307, 334 (2008). This inquiry will get us out of the constitutional vocabulary and focus
us on processes that assign control of the material substrata that support contested
microperformances of identity.
18.
See Madhavi Sunder, Note, Authorship and Autonomy as Rites of Exclusion: The
IntellectualPropertizationof FreeSpeech in Hurley v. Irsh-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group of Boston, 49 STAN. L. REv. 143 (1996) (analyzing Hurley v Irish-American Gay,Lesbian
& Bisexual GroupofBoston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995)).

LA W& SEXUALITY

[Vol. 19

accounts of federalism to explain Kulturkamp2. I suggested a new term,
"beachhead federalism," for situations where combatants in a
Kulturkampfare not engaged in regulatory experiments, but rather seek
to "win" by controlling all of the territory that they can in order to
facilitate their moral claim to correctness. 20 A property owner's claim of
a religion-based right to exclude same-sex couples from access to a
beachfront pavilion for the purpose of conducting same-sex civil union
ceremonies is one contemporary example of a small territorial claim."
LGBTQ scholars must revisit First Amendment principles,
informed now by considerations of place, space, and territory. We must
engage property theory which, properly understood, studies the dynamics
of allocating the control and use of shared resources. Clinging to the
literal words of the First Amendment simply does not get us there. We
need to enrich these words by developing a fuller account of "expressive
identity."22 Timothy Zick's attention to recurring "spatial tactics" and
"microgeographic principles" in First Amendment law is a promising
start; but Zick focuses on political events and protests, not identity
performances. 3 The next phase of LGBTQ scholarship should include
sociological and reconceptualized doctrinal accounts of battles over
place, space, and territory, as they bear on control of identity performances. For example, in one classic case, Judge Pettine opined that a
same-sex couple's presence at a high school prom was different from and
more suited to First Amendment protection than more traditional First
Amendment activities such as leafleting or speechmaking. 4 We need to
be able to explain why.

19.

See Marc R. Poirier, Same-Sex Mamrage, Identity Processes,and the Kulturkampf;

Why FederlismIs Not the MainEven4 17 TEMPLE POL. & C.R. L. REv 387 (2008).
20. Id at 393-95 (describing "beachhead federalism").
21.
I have written about this ongoing controversy in Ocean Grove, New Jersey, most

recently in Poirier, supra note 3, at 51-59.
22. See Nan D. Hunter, ExpressiveIdentity: RecuperatingDissentfor Equality, 35 HARV
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2000).
23.
Timothy Zick, Place, Space, and Speech: The Expressive Topography, 74 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 439,455-85 (2006).
24. Fricke v. Lynch, 491 E Supp. 381, 385 n.4 (D.R.I.1980).

